El problema para los responsables de la filtración era que en aquellos documentos no había nada relevante. De hecho, enseguida se vio que el material filtrado contenía información equívoca fabricada para crear confusión:
The leak package is huge – 9Gb – suggesting at a quick glance (all the time anyone had) that there was a lot of scandalous or incriminating content. No such luck. Although this was promoted as #MacronLeaks, there are no emails from Macron. The majority of the package seems to be padding to fill it out.
The archive was intentionally packaged to give the appearance of a data dump containing documents, emails and other recent primary sources regarding Macron. It contains nothing of the sort. The packaging was maliciously crafted to deliberately mislead a cursory reading.
There is direct evidence that some of the documents have been altered from their original source. What actual tampering has been done is impossible to know given only the data supplied by the malicious agency. Some content is highly peculiar – an emailed receipt to an obscure old politician for 10 grams of 3MMC, purchased with Bitcoin, to be shipped direct to the National Assembly!
Foto de Louis Vest |
Package old intelligence data into an archive structured to appear like current Macron intel. Craft and amplify short scary narratives allegedly supported by evidence inside the leak – e.g. “Macron was in contact with a Mid East arms dealer, was he selling weapons to ISIS??” (reality: ISIS didn’t exist when the arms dealer sent those emails to someone not-Macron, and Macron was in school at the time.) Use the troll armies to amplify and promote the leak and the narratives. As soon as word of the massive leak, and the incendiary allegations, makes it out into the French consciousness the law will prohibit further analysis or discussion.Era evidente que la filtración se produjo para influir en el resultado del sufragio. Ya había ocurrido algo similar en las elecciones estadounidenses del año pasado pero esta vez era demasiado descarado. En esta ocasión el titiritero había mostrado claramente los hilos, como si ya no necesitara esconderlos de las marionetas, convencido de que los cráneos de estas están totalmente huecos.
No será la última vez que tenga lugar una argucia de este tipo (aunque probablemente cambie la forma en la que se haga). Es el hecho que la sociedad civil siempre ha sido un objetivo relativamente indefenso de los gobiernos y las elites, los cuales aprovechan las nuevas plataformas de comunicación para sus planes:
Russia-linked cyber espionage campaigns, particularly those involving targeting around the 2016 U.S. elections, and more recently the 2017 French election, have dominated the media in recent months. As serious as these events are, often overlooked in both media and industry reports on cyber espionage is a critical and persistent victim group: global civil society.Como digo, nada de esto es nuevo. Desde siempre, los ciudadanos hemos tenido que guardarnos de las mentiras de nuestros propios mandatarios, así como de los embustes que llegan sobre ellos allende las fronteras:
A healthy, fully-functioning, and vibrant civil society is the antithesis of non-democratic rule, and as a consequence, powerful elites threatened by their actions routinely direct their powerful spying apparatuses toward civil society to infiltrate, anticipate, and even neutralize their activities. Unlike industry and government, however, civil society groups typically lack resources, institutional depth, and capacity to deal with these assaults. For different reasons, they also rarely factor into threat industry reporting or government policy around cyber espionage, and can be the silent, overlooked victims.
In politics, the art of innuendo in the United States goes back to the birth of the nation in what were called "whispering campaigns." For example, rumors circulated that Thomas Jefferson was an atheist and had debauched a well-born Virginia belle, that Martin van Buren was the illegitimate son of Aaron Burr, that Andrew Jackson had lived with his wife before marriage, and that John Quincy Adams had acted as a pander for a Russian nobleman. The tradition continues into the modern era. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon's campaign staff hired "dirty tricksters" to spread rumors about leading Democratic candidates—rumors that many political analysts believe were at the heart of the withdrawal of front-runningEdmund Muskie from the presidential race.Pero no son solo los políticos quienes juegan a ser titiriteros. Cada uno de nosotros engulle diariamente toneladas de publicidad fabricadas por las marcas. Los personajes públicos, sean o no políticos, contratan asesores de imagen para moldear la percepción que tenemos de ellos. Personas con intereses comunes forman grupos de presión (lobbies, fundaciones, institutos, asociaciones, webs) para obtener privilegios, defender los que ya tienen o extender sus ideas económicas, políticas o religiosas. En el lugar de trabajo, nuestros compañeros y, especialmente, nuestros jefes, tratan de persuadirnos para que les ayudemos a alcanzar sus objetivos. En casa, nuestras parejas, hijos y amigos nos manipulan para que hagamos esto o aquello. A lo largo de nuestra vida todos estamos influidos por el zeitgeist.
[...] The use of factoids is also a common practice in campaigns against other nations. Adolf Hitler and his propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, mastered the art of what has been termed "the big lie." According to Nazi propaganda theory, one effective way to persuade the masses is to develop and repeat falsehoods—for example, "The German people are a master race; Europe is menaced by the Jewish conspiracy." Such big lies are difficult to prove false. For example, the fact that there is no evidence that a Jewish conspiracy exists is just further evidence regarding the cleverness of Jews. The big lie is then supported by many small but often irrelevant facts to make the big lie all that more believable—for example, some Jews own banks and Karl Marx, the founder of communism, was Jewish.
No hay escapatoria. Incluso si estamos solos y aislados del resto de seres humanos cada uno de nosotros es su propio maestro de marionetas cuando cede a sus apetitos e instintos naturales, a los miedos que todos albergamos, a las ambiciones que nos impulsan.
Decía el Doctor Manhattan en Watchmen: «We're all puppets, Laurie. I'm just a puppet who can see the strings». Ese personaje de ficción se refería al determinismo de las leyes de la física, mientras que yo me refiero al control que los seres humanos tratamos de ejercer entre nuestros semejantes. En este caso el problema no es ver los hilos; todos sabemos que los políticos y los publicistas nos mienten para obtener algo de nosotros. El problema es conseguir ser inmune a sus tejemanejes. Por desgracia, el mero hecho de saber que el comunicador está tratando de influenciarnos no siempre nos protege de su mensaje:
A public opinion poll showed that the overwhelming majority of adult respondents believe television commercials contain untruthful arguments. Moreover, the results indicate that the more educated the person, the more skeptical, and that people who are skeptical believe their skepticism makes them immune to persuasion.Según Elliot Aronson, una de las razones de que esto ocurra es que solemos recibir esos mensajes cuando estamos distraídos, cansados o no nos apetece pensar. En esa situación nuestras defensas intelectuales no se despliegan, no nos esforzamos por refutar el mensaje y, como consecuencia, acabamos siendo convencidos. La publicidad es el ejemplo más obvio, con la política siguiéndole muy de cerca (en especial cuando la comunicación encaja con nuestros prejuicios o ideas).
This might lead us to conclude that the mere fact of knowing a communicator is biased protects us from being influenced by the message. But [...] this is not always the case. Simply because we think we are immune to persuasion does not necessarily mean we are immune. For example, although attempts to teach children about advertising and its purposes have led to more skepticism about advertising, this skepticism seldom translates into less desire for advertised brands. Similarly, many adults tend to buy a specific brand for no other reason than the fact that it is heavily advertised.
Claro que ¿a quién le queda energías al final del día para informarse, contrastar y desmentir? Aronson termina su libro sobre el abuso de la propaganda con una lista de veinticuatro contramedidas pero todas ellas exceden las capacidades de una sola persona o exigen más esfuerzo del que un individuo común está dispuesto a invertir.
Todos somos marionetas y con frecuencia podemos ver los hilos. Lo que ocurre es que no hay un solo titiritero sino miles de ellos (incluyéndonos a nosotros mismos) y es muy difícil escapar de las cuerdas de todos.